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ABSTRACT 
Cyber-attacks have become increasingly common and are an 
integral part of contemporary armed conflicts. With that premise 
in mind, the question arises of whether or not a civilian carrying 
out cyber-attacks during an armed conflict becomes a legitimate 
target under international humanitarian law. This paper aims to 
explore this question using three different analytical and 
conceptual frameworks while looking at a variety of cyber-attacks 
along with their subsequent effects. One of the core principles of 
the law of armed conflict is distinction, which states that civilians 
in an armed conflict are granted a set of protections, mainly the 
protection from direct attacks by the adversary, whereas 
combatants (or members of armed groups) and military objectives 
may become legitimate targets of direct attacks. Although 
civilians are generally protected from direct attacks, they can still 
become victims of an attack because they lose this protection “for 
such time as they take direct part in hostilities.”1 In other words, 
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1 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 
51(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]. In the non-international 
armed conflict context, see Article 13(3) of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
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under certain circumstances, if a civilian decides to engage in 
hostile cyber activities (or “hacktivities”), they may well become 
a target of a direct lethal attack. I will argue that although the 
answer is highly nuanced and context dependent, the most 
salutary doctrinal revision that can be made in this area is that 
the threshold of harm must adapt to the particular intricacies of 
cyberspace.  
INTRODUCTION TO TARGETING IN MODERN CONFLICT 
 In August 2015, a U.S. drone strike in Syria killed Junaid Hussain, 
a British hacker who was carrying out hostile cyber activities on behalf of 
ISIS.2 Hussain was believed to have a leading position in ISIS’ Cyber 
Caliphate, a hacking group that allegedly took control of US Central 
Command’s social media accounts. This group published U.S. soldiers’ 
and officers’ identifying information, such as their full names, addresses, 
and photos.3 Unlike other members of ISIS, Hussain only engaged in cyber 
activities which, although they were hostile, did not pose the same threat 
of imminent danger as the actual use of conventional military force. 
Hussain’s death represents the first time a hacker was lethally targeted. 
This article predicts that the practice of targeting hackers in the context of 
an armed conflict will only increase because cyber-attacks will become a 
more frequent and substantial phenomenon in armed conflicts. The crucial 
question in this regard is whether individuals like Hussain are legitimate 
targets under international humanitarian law (IHL) in armed conflict.  
 The emergence of cyberspace as an instrument of warfare 
exacerbates the gaps and ambiguities that already exist within IHL. A 
particularly aggravating factor is the increased involvement of civilians in 
cyber-attacks. Civilians in modern armed conflicts can play an active role 
when it comes to cyber-attacks, as they serve as private contractors 
carrying out both offensive and defensive cyber operations.4 In addition to 
                                                          
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 
[hereinafter AP II]. 
2 Spencer Ackerman, Ewan MacAskill & Alice Ross, Junaid Hussain: British 
Hacker for ISIS Believed Killed in US Air Strike, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2015, 
12:28 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/27/junaid-hussain-
british-hacker-for-isis-believed-killed-in-us-airstrike.  
3 Julia Glum, ISIS Hacker Junaid Hussain Confirmed Dead After US Airstrike on 
Islamic State in Syria: Pentagon, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (Aug. 28, 
2015, 2:52 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-hacker-junaid-hussain-confirmed-
dead-after-us-airstrike-islamic-state-syria-2073451. 
4 See Heather Harrison Dinniss, Cyber Warriors, Patriotic Hackers and the Laws 
of War, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW & THE CHANGING TECHNOLOGY 
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these private contractors, there are patriotic hackers who make similar 
contributions.5 While the traditional notion of an armed conflict includes 
members of regular armed forces (“combatants”), this paradigm is no 
longer the case on the modern battlefield due to the growing involvement 
of civilians in cyber hostilities. As Susan Brenner, a leading expert on 
cyber conflict, stated,  the “integration of civilians into military efforts can 
create uncertainty as to whether someone is acting as a ‘civilian’ 
(noncombatant) or as a military actor (combatant).”6 After all, it is far 
easier to possess a computer with an active internet connection than a 
conventional weapon.7 This is because computer technology is readily 
accessible and carries a low cost of entry and use.8  
 In fact, in the aftermath of the cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007, 
the Estonian government decided to recruit civilian volunteers to serve as 
“cyber warriors” should another major cyber-attack on Estonia occur.9 
Sean Watts, Professor of Law at Creighton University, explained this 
phenomenon of the privatization of cyber operations by describing how 
today, many companies provide the expertise required for the development 
and employment of computer network attacks.10 
 The versatility of computers and cyberspace has caused 
difficulties for countries that wish to utilize computers militarily, while 
retaining their civilian properties. This is sometimes referred to as the 
                                                          
OF WAR 269 (Dan Saxon ed., 2013) (noting that civilian contractors are 
increasingly involved in cyber hostilities). 
5 Id.   
6 SUSAN BRENNER, CYBERTHREATS, THE EMERGING FAULT LINES OF THE NATION 
STATE 197 (2009). 
7 See Roger Barnett, A Different Kettle of Fish: Computer Network Attack, 76 J. 
INT’L. L. STUD. 1, 22 (2002) (stating that the “entry costs to conduct a strategic 
information attack are insignificant” and requite only “an inexpensive computer, 
some easily obtainable software, and a simple connection to the Internet.”). 
8 See MARCO ROSCINI, CYBER OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE 202 (2014) 
(noting that the “low cost and ease of access to technology” allows civilians to 
easily conduct cyber operations). 
9 David Blair, Estonia Recruits Volunteer Army of ‘Cyber Warriors’, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Apr. 26, 2015, 6:58 PM BST), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
worldnews/europe/estonia/11564163/Estonia-recruits-volunteer-army-of-cyber-
warriors.html.  
10 See Sean Watts, Combatant Status and Computer Network Attack, 50 VA. J. 
INT’L L.  391, 402–03 (2010) (“Reports indicate that few information operations 
experts currently serve as active duty soldiers. Many private companies have 
employed the skills of those with expertise in the various weapons commonly 
used in [Computer Network Attacks].”).   
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“dual-use” characteristic of cyberspace.11 Dual-use means that computer 
systems and networks may be used for legitimate, benign, civilian 
purposes, but at the same time, these systems and networks may be used 
by the military, or by civilians, for hostile purposes.12 While this 
characteristic is clear to countries, their civilians are often unaware of the 
potential consequences of their involvement in cyber operations in armed 
conflict, the importance of which may be life or death. Such was the case 
with Evgeny Morozov, who participated in the cyber operations against 
Georgia in 2008 –  
“Not knowing exactly how to sign up for a cyberwar, I started with 
an extensive survey of the Russian blogosphere… As I learned from 
this blog post, all I needed to do was to save a copy of a certain Web 
page to my hard drive and then open it in my browser. In less than an 
hour, I had become an Internet soldier. I didn’t receive any calls from 
Kremlin operatives; nor did I have to buy a Web server or modify my 
computer in any significant way.”13 
 The problem of civilians who directly participate in hostilities 
(DPH) is not particularly new. Yet even today, many find themselves 
unable to define the precise boundaries of the notion of DPH. Only in 2009 
did the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) publish the 
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation of Hostilities  
(“Interpretive Guidance”), which attempted to deal with the phenomenon 
of civilians who decide to directly participate in hostilities and the legal 
                                                          
11 See Mary O’Connell, Cyber Security Without Cyber War, 17 J. CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 187, 205 (2012) (comparing cyberspace to other existing treaty 
regimes of arms control, noting that “[t]he international community has adopted 
treaties in other ‘dual-use’ areas that are analogous to cyber space, such as the 
Chemical Weapons Convention and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Both 
of these treaties seek to end any use or even possession of chemical or nuclear 
weapons while at the same time promoting legitimate non-military uses of 
chemicals and nuclear power”).  
12 See Kai Ambos, International Criminal Responsibility in Cyberspace, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CYBERSPACE 118, 131 
(Tsagourias & Buchan eds., 2015) (explaining that the “interconnectivity between 
civilian and military purposes” of cyberspace complicates the principle of 
distinction between civilians and combatants). 
13 Evgeny Morozov, An Army of Ones and Zeroes: How I Became a Soldier in the 
Georgia-Russia Cyberwar, SLATE (Aug. 14, 2008), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/technology/technology/2008/08/an_army_of_ones_and_zeroes.html.  
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and practical ramifications of such a decision.14 The main consequences 
of such participation are the forfeiture of civilian protections and the 
legitimization of lethal targeting against civilians who DPH. The 
Interpretive Guidance does not directly deal with the issues raised by cyber 
warfare, but it does provide the general paradigm for civilians who DPH.  
 Additional attempts to address cyberspace and armed conflict are 
reflected in the 2013 Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable 
to Cyber Warfare (“Tallinn Manual”), a NATO sponsored non-binding 
codification of the international legal norms applicable to the wartime use 
of cyber-attacks.15 This document specifically deals with cyber warfare 
(as opposed to the more general Interpretive Guidance by the ICRC), but 
it is not legally binding.16 The recent Law of War Manual by the U.S. 
Department of Defense addresses the notion of DPH, but does not 
sufficiently elaborate on its connection to cyberspace.17  
 This paper argues that the boundary between legitimate activity in 
cyberspace during armed conflict (or, participation in war efforts) and 
hostile activities, which constitute DPH, is unclear. This resulting 
ambiguity has operational consequences, such as the inability to determine 
whether a specific individual is targetable in as a result of his or her actions 
in cyberspace.18 Furthermore, this paper argues that cyber activities by 
                                                          
14 NILS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON 
THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009) [hereinafter INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE].  
15 See generally TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO 
CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN 
MANUAL], https://ccdcoe.org/tallinn-manual.html (discussing the legal issues 
surrounding cyberwarfare). 
16 Id. at 5.  
17 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL 222–27 (2015) 
[hereinafter LAW OF WAR MANUAL], http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/ 
Documents/pubs/Law-of-War-Manual-June-2015.pdf (discussing generally the 
complexities of civilian actions in hostilities but missing an elaboration on civilian 
hacking activities).  
18 This unclear boundary between direct participation in hostilities and 
participation in war efforts was already controversial and highly debated at the 
conclusion of the 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, as 
provided in the INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE 
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 
AUGUST 1949 at 619 (Yves Sandos et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter ICRC 
COMMENTARY ON APS], http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/ 
Commentary_GC_Protocols.pdf (“There should be a clear distinction between 
direct participation in hostilities and participation in the war effort. The latter is 
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civilians belonging to the opposing party of an armed conflict should meet 
a certain threshold in order to be considered DPH. Although the “threshold 
of harm” requirement is the first prerequisite under the DPH paradigm, it 
is unclear what activities in cyberspace reach this threshold, as cyberspace 
challenges the notions of physicality, political borders, and state monopoly 
on force. This paper argues that the DPH framework may have to be more 
responsive to the myriad harms that emanate from cyberspace activities.  
I. CIVILIANS AND THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN 
HOSTILITIES 
 International humanitarian law is a specific branch of international 
law that regulates and limits conduct in times of armed conflict.19 It is a 
set of principles and norms codified in treaties, such as the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols from 1977, and 
customary international law.20 The key purpose of IHL is its attempt to 
minimize the adverse effects associated with war, particularly the effects 
on uninvolved individuals and collectives, namely civilians.21  
 Determining whether an individual is a civilian or not (based on 
his or her status, rather than acts) is a separate and complicated issue. 
Article 50 of Additional Protocol I defines a civilian as “any person who 
does not belong to one of the categories of the persons referred to in Article 
                                                          
often required from the population as a whole to various degrees. Without such a 
distinction the efforts made to reaffirm and develop international humanitarian 
law could become meaningless. In fact, in modern conflicts, many activities of 
the nation contribute to the conduct of hostilities, directly or indirectly; even the 
morale of the population plays a role in this context.”).  
19 See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law: Answers 
to Your Questions (2002), http://www.redcross.org/images/MEDIA_Custom 
ProductCatalog/m22303661_IHL-FAQ.pdf (“The purpose of international 
humanitarian law is to limit the suffering caused by war by protecting and 
assisting its victims as far as possible.”). 
20See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/sicj/icj_statute_e.pdf 
(stating that international custom, also known as customary international law, is 
“general practice accepted as law”).   
21 See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 115 (2004) (“The first and foremost inference 
from the basic rule is that direct—and deliberate—attacks against civilians are 
forbidden.”). 
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4A (1) (2), (3) and (6).”22Where there is doubt, a person should be 
presumed a civilian.”23 Although this definition helps in understanding 
who qualifies as a civilian, it does not provide any guidance as to whether 
a civilian is DPH. 
 One of the fundamental principles of IHL is distinction, which 
provides that an attack should distinguish between civilians and 
combatants, and between civilian and military objectives.24 Distinction 
predates modern IHL, and has been part of the law of wars jurisprudence 
for centuries – “Slaughter of men armed and resisting is the law of war… 
it is reasonable that they who have taken arms should be punished in battle, 
but that Non-combatants are not to be hurt.”25 The principle of distinction 
is comprised of various specific obligations. First, civilians can never be 
the object of direct attacks by a party to an armed conflict.26 That is, 
                                                          
22 Article 4(A) (1), (2), (3), and (6) of the Third Geneva Convention (Convention 
(III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949), 
reads: 
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as 
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed 
forces. 
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, 
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party 
to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this 
territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, 
including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following 
conditions: 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a 
distance; 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the 
laws and customs of war. 
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a 
government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power. 
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the 
enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without 
having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided 
they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war. 
23 AP I, supra note 1, art. 50(1). 
24 AP I, supra note 1, arts. 51–52. 
25 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 216 (William Whewell 
trans., London, John W. Parker 1853) (1625) (emphasis in original).  
26 AP I, supra note 1, art. 51(2).  
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adversaries are prohibited from aiming their weapons at civilians or 
civilian objects. Additionally, acts of violence, which are primarily 
intended to terrorize the civilian population, are prohibited.27 Second, 
attacks which cannot sufficiently discriminate between civilians and 
combatants are prohibited.28 Third, any attack resulting in collateral 
damage in the form of civilian casualties, injuries, and damage to civilian 
objects should be proportionate to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated from such an attack29 (colloquially referred to as 
“proportionality” and considered a distinct, fundamental principle of 
IHL).30  
 These broad civilian protections (also referred to as “non-
combatant immunity”31) come with a specific exception. Namely, 
civilians only enjoy these protections “unless and for such time as they 
take a direct part in hostilities.”32 This exception represents the core 
principle that uninvolved civilians are protected from direct attacks, but, 
once they participate, they forfeit their civilian protections and become 
viable targets under IHL.33 Although the exception appears in Additional 
Protocols, it represents customary international law and is binding upon 
all states regardless of ratification status.34 
 The commentary to Additional Protocol I defines direct 
participation in hostilities as “acts of war which are intended by their 
                                                          
27 Id. 
28 AP I, supra note 1, art. 51(4). 
29 AP I, supra note 1, art. 51(1)(b). 
30 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 1 INT’L COMM. OF THE 
RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 46–50 (2005), 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-
humanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf (rule 14). 
31 See, e.g., JUDITH GARDAM, NON-COMBATANT IMMUNITY AS A NORM OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 116 (1993) (noting that the prevention of 
indiscriminate attacks on civilians is “the general rule of noncombatant 
immunity” in international humanitarian law). 
32 AP I, supra note 1, art. 51(3); AP II, supra note 1, art. 13(3). 
33 See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in 
Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 697, 702 
(2010) (stating that “international humanitarian law suspends . . . civilian 
protections” when civilians directly participate in hostilities).  
34 See HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Israel 62(1) PD 
507 (2006) (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/ 
02007690.a34.pdf, ¶ 12 (noting that the exception to civilian protections “reflects 
a customary rule of international law” and thus binds all states).   
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nature or their purpose to hit specifically the personnel and the matériel35 
of the armed forces of the adverse Party.”36 It is highly significant that the 
temporal scope of the targetability of civilians engaged in DPH remains 
unclear and continues to generate considerable controversy.37 Moreover, 
civilians who DPH are not granted immunity from prosecution under 
domestic criminal law for their activities in the hostilities, as the immunity 
is associated with combatants who belong to recognized armed forces.38 
However, civilians engaging in DPH who are captured while committing 
their hostile activities are granted certain minimal protections under 
Article 75 of Additional Protocol I39 or Common Article 3,40 depending 
on the classification of the armed conflict.41 
 In this context, the ICRC Interpretive Guidance provides a 
framework to address the phenomenon of civilians who DPH.42 Although 
the Interpretive Guidance has garnered approval and is generally well 
                                                          
35 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 835 (11th ed. 2004) (defining “matériel” 
as “equipment and supplies used by soldiers”) 
36 ICRC COMMENTARY ON APS, supra note 18, at 516. 
37 Id. at 1453 (“If a civilian participates directly in hostilities, it is clear that he 
will not enjoy any protection against attacks for as long as his participation lasts. 
Thereafter, as he no longer presents any danger for the adversary, he may not be 
attacked; moreover, in case of doubt regarding the status of an individual, he is 
presumed to be a civilian. Anyone suspected of having taken part in hostilities and 
deprived of his liberty for this reason will have the benefit of the provisions laid 
down in Articles 4 (Fundamental guarantees), 5 (Persons whose liberty has been 
restricted), and 6 (Penal prosecutions).”). 
38 See Kenneth Watkin, Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged 
Belligerents, and the Struggle over Legitimacy, HARV. PROGRAM ON 
HUMANITARIAN POL’Y & CONFLICT RES. OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES, No. 2, 
Winter 2005, at 12–13 (noting that combatants “have a special status . . . [which 
includes] the right to participate in hostilities and receive immunity from 
prosecution . . . for killing carried out in accordance with the law.”). 
39 AP I, supra note 1, art. 75 (international armed conflict). 
40 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Common Article 3]. In 
non-international armed conflict, such detainees would be granted humane 
treatment, and Common Article 3 would apply, along with customary 
international law and human rights law, where a gap exists. 
41 See THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 44, 49 (Dieter 
Fleck ed., 3d ed. 2013) (stating that “[a]n international armed conflict exists if one 
state uses armed force against another state” and that “[a] non-international armed 
conflict is a situation of protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a state”). 
42 See generally INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 14. 
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received in academic and legal-military communities, it only represents 
the institutional view of the ICRC.43 Due to the lack of precedential law 
regarding DPH and the reputation of the ICRC as having expertise in IHL, 
the Interpretive Guidance is often the only framework used to determine 
whether or not a civilian is engaging in DPH.44 The conclusions of the 
Interpretive Guidance are sometimes controversial and highly contested, 
and there is substantial criticism of these determinations from both 
military and academic perspectives.45 
 The core of the DPH paradigm as provided by the Interpretive 
Guidance lies in three criteria that are required in order for an individual 
to be considered a civilian engaged in DPH.46 First, a certain threshold of 
harm needs to be met.47 Second, there needs to be a direct causal link 
between the act in question and the harm caused.48 Third, the act needs to 
be designed to cause harm in support of one party to the conflict and to the 
detriment of the opposing party of the conflict (also known as a 
“belligerent nexus”).49  
A. Threshold of Harm 
 Not every hostile action by civilians will reach the threshold 
required for the DPH label. The Interpretive Guidance requires that the act 
in question reach a certain severity threshold in relation to the harm caused 
(or likely to be caused) in order for that individual to forfeit his civilian 
status.50 The Interpretive Guidance provides two tests for determining 
whether the threshold of harm has been reached. First, an act must be likely 
to adversely affect the military operations or capacity of a party to the 
                                                          
43 See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 9 (stating that “the 10 
recommendations made by the Interpretive Guidance, as well as the 
accompanying commentary, do not endeavour to change binding rules of 
customary or treaty IHL, but reflect the ICRC’s institutional position as to how 
existing IHL should be interpreted”). 
44 See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 33. 
45 See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, The ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian 
Law: An Introduction to the Forum, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 637 (2010). 
46 INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 46. 
47 Id. at 48.  
48 Id. at 51.  
49 Id. at 58. 
50 Id. at 47 (“The qualification of an act as direct participation does not require the 
materialization of harm reaching the threshold but merely the objective likelihood 
that the act will result in such harm”). 
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armed conflict.51 Second, an act must be likely to inflict death, injury, or 
destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack.52 The 
likelihood standard is evaluated objectively in each case.53 
 While the threshold of likelihood of “death, injury or destruction 
on persons or objects” is quite straightforward, the threshold of the 
likelihood to “adversely affect the military capacity or capacity of a party 
to the armed conflict” is somewhat obscure. An act that could result in 
death, injury or destruction has the same consequences as an act that is 
likely to affect military capacity or capacity of a party to the armed 
conflict.  In other words, in both cases, the civilian who carries out the 
hostile act would be targetable, should he satisfy the remaining two 
requirements. In Targeted Killings, the Israeli Supreme Court suggested 
that “acts which by nature and objective are intended to cause damage to 
civilians” be part of the threshold of harm requirement, however that 
requirement may already be included in the “death, injury or 
destruction.”54 
 Currently, it is unlikely that a cyber-attack will be objectively 
likely to cause death, injury, or destruction, although it might be possible 
with destructive cyber-attacks against critical cyber infrastructure, such as 
hospitals and power plants.55 Conversely, cyber-attacks can be highly 
disruptive and substantially affect military capacity.56 However, it is 
debatable whether a particular cyber-attack actually affects military 
capacity or simply represents a form of expression, propaganda, or mild 
nuisance. The Interpretive Guidance excluded “manipulation of computer 
networks” from the application of the DPH framework, even though such 
acts might “have a serious impact on public security, health and 
                                                          
51 Id. at 46. 
52 INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 47. 
53 Id.  
54 HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Israel 62(1) PD 507 
(2006) (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/ 
02007690.a34.pdf, ¶ 33.  
55 See, e.g., Scott A. Newton, Can Cyberterrorists Actually Kill People?, SANS 
INST. INFOSEC READING ROOM (2002), https://www.sans.org/reading-room/ 
whitepapers/warfare/cyberterrorists-kill-people-820.  
56 See Shane Quinlan, Jam. Bomb. Hack? U.S. Cyber Capabilities and the 
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, GEO. SECURITY STUD. REV. (Apr. 7, 2014), 
http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2014/04/07/jam-bomb-hack-new-u-
s-cyber-capabilities-and-the-suppression-of-enemy-air-defenses/ (explaining 
how Israel bombed a Syrian nuclear reactor and managed to avoid detection by 
the aerial defense systems using a cyber-attack).  
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commerce.”57 The Interpretive Guidance briefly addressed the possibility 
of cyber-attacks affecting military capacity by providing that “electronic 
interference with military computer networks could also suffice, whether 
through computer network attacks (CNA) or computer network 
exploitations (CNE), as well as wiretapping the adversary’s high 
command or transmitting tactical targeting information for an attack.”58 
B. Direct Causal Link 
 The second requirement of the DPH framework is that the act in 
question directly causes the harm.59 In a modern society, the activities and 
occupations that civilians pursue could contribute to the military defeat of 
an adversary. Examples include attacking weapons production, 
construction, political propaganda, production of goods, and the supply of 
electricity and fuel.60 However, even though these activities could 
ultimately result in severe harm, reaching the threshold of harm as set in 
the first requirement, they may not satisfy the second requirement of a 
direct causal link.61 Therefore, civilians who contribute to war efforts in 
such indirect ways would not be directly participating in hostilities and 
their protected civilian status would remain intact.62 
 The prevailing test to determine causation is determining whether 
the harm caused is only one causal step away from the act.63 Therefore, all 
the capacity building, services, and production activities are far removed 
in the causal chain and will not be considered as direct causal acts. 
However, the Interpretive Guidance argues that acts that in isolation do 
not cause harm, when done in conjunction with other acts that cause the 
                                                          
57 INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 50.  
58 INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 48 & n.101 (“CNA have been 
tentatively defined as ‘operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information 
resident in computers and computer networks, or the computer and networks 
themselves’ and may be conducted over long distances through radio waves or 
international communication networks. While they may not involve direct 
physical damage, the resulting system malfunctions can be devastating. CNE, 
namely ‘the ability to gain access to information hosted on information systems 
and the ability to make use of the system itself,’ though not of a direct destructive 
nature, could have equally significant military implications. During the expert 
meetings, CNA causing military harm to the adversary in a situation of armed 
conflict were clearly regarded as part of the hostilities.”) (citations omitted). 






13 ICRC, NATO AND THE U.S. [Vol. 15 
 
required threshold of harm, will be seen as direct causation acts (for 
example – transmission of intelligence, instructing and assisting troops in 
executing military operations, etc.).64 
 An important point that also relates to cyber-attacks is the 
distinction between causal proximity and temporal or geographic 
proximity.65 The fact that a certain hostile act is delayed or distant does 
not necessarily affect the causality of that act. An example of both a 
delayed and distant hostile act might be a cyber-attack carried out by State 
A against State B over international borders. State A collects military 
intelligence during the attack, and the harm from the attack materializes 
after a certain period of time. Although the cyber-attack was initiated by 
one nation-state and materially affected a state thousands of miles away 
after time had elapsed (i.e. no temporal or geographical proximity), it is 
nonetheless clear that there is causal proximity between the cyber-attack 
and the harm. In this case, the adverse effect is on the military operations 
of State B against State A.  
 Additionally, the effects of most cyber operations might be 
secondary or tertiary in nature, further complicating the direct causation 
requirement.66 Particularly challenging are cyber operations that cause 
effects in multiple causal steps. This is especially the case with unaware 
actors being involved in the form of intermediate, compromised computer 
                                                          
64 Id. at 55. 
65 Id. 
66 See TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION 
AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 127 (William A. Owens, Kenneth W. 
Dam & Herbert S. Lin eds., 2009) (“One of the most difficult-to-handle aspects 
of a cyberattack is that in contrast to a kinetic attack that is almost always intended 
to destroy a physical target, the desired effects of a cyberattack are almost always 
indirect, which means that what are normally secondary effects are in fact of 
central importance. In general, the planner must develop chains of causality—do 
X, and Y happens, which causes Z to happen, which in turn causes A to happen. 
Also, many of the intervening events between initial cause and ultimate effect are 
human reactions (e.g., in response to an attack that does X, the [target] network 
administrator will likely respond in way Y, which means that Z—which may be 
preplanned—must take response Y into account). Moreover, the links in the causal 
chain may not all be of similar character—they may involve computer actions and 
results, or human perceptions and decisions, all of which combine into some 
outcome.”). 
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systems and networks.67 In cases like this, the direct causation requirement 
might be the hardest to satisfy in the cyber operation context.68 
C. Belligerent Nexus 
 The belligerent nexus requirement is the third and last condition 
for a civilian to be considered a DPH. It requires that the hostile act in 
question is specifically designed to cause the required threshold of harm 
and is specifically designed to do so in support of one party to the armed 
conflict at the detriment of the opposing party.69 This requirement serves 
two functions. First, it targets acts that happen in the context of an armed 
conflict with the purpose of empowering one party over the other. Second, 
it ignores acts that happen regardless of an ongoing armed conflict, even 
though the harm caused could reach the required threshold and the harm 
was directly caused by the act. Thus, when hostile actions are not related 
to the armed conflict, the civilian is not a DPH and the appropriate 
punishment will come from normal law enforcement.  In other words, the 
act is not fulfilling the belligerent nexus requirement.70 The Interpretive 
Guidance provides that the determination of whether a belligerent nexus 
exists in relation to a specific act– 
must be based on the information reasonably available to the person 
called on to make the determination, but they must always be deduced 
from objectively verifiable factors. In practice, the decisive question 
should be whether the conduct of a civilian, in conjunction with the 
circumstances prevailing at the relevant time and place, can 
reasonably be perceived as an act designed to support one party to the 
conflict by directly causing the required threshold of harm to another 
party.71 
 Cyber-attacks happen on a daily basis, both inside and outside of 
armed conflict. Therefore, the belligerent nexus requirement can be 
challenging to establish should a cyber-attack occur in an armed conflict 
context. Such cyber-attacks might fulfill the threshold of harm and direct 
                                                          
67 See David Turns, Cyber Warfare and the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities, 17 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 279, 288 (2012). 
68 Id. at 296; see also Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Cyber Warriors and the Jus in 
Bello, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 288, 298 (2013) (“The ‘direct causation’ requirement 
appears easier to meet in the context of cyber operations than in traditional kinetic 
operations.”).  
69 INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 58. 
70 Id. at 64. 
71 Id. at 63–64. 
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causation requirements, yet the determination that the cyber-attack meets 
the belligerent nexus requirement may be attenuated.  
D. The Notion of “Continuous Combat Function” 
 The notion of continuous combat function (CCF) is an essential 
supplement to the three requirements associated with the DPH 
framework.72 It is generally believed that the DPH status is temporal, that 
is, it only applies to civilians for such time as they take direct part in 
hostilities,73 so civilians who carry out hostile acts sporadically, 
spontaneously, or on an unorganized basis are targetable only while they 
are actively carrying out these acts.74 However, there is an assumption that 
when a civilian assumes an integral role in an organized armed group and 
whose “continuous function involves the preparation, execution, or 
command of acts or operations amounting to direct participation in 
hostilities,” the civilian is CCF.75 According to the principle of CCF, such 
a civilian would be targetable even if he or she is not carrying out hostile 
acts at the moment of the targeting. In other words, a civilian who is CCF 
is targetable due to his or her status, which materialized as a result of his 
or her continuous and persistent actions. In contrast, a DPH civilian is 
targetable only for such time as he carries out his or her hostile acts. This 
means that: 
civilians lose protection against direct attack for the duration of each 
specific act amounting to direct participation in hostilities, whereas 
members of organized armed groups belonging to a non-state party 
to an armed conflict cease to be civilians, and lose protection against 
direct attack for as long as they assume their continuous combat 
function.76 
 Thus, a hacker who carries out cyber-attacks in an armed conflict 
continuously and assumes membership in an organized armed group that 
is a party to the armed conflict would be considered a civilian with CCF. 
Consequently, this hacker is targetable at all times, as long as the CCF 
label remains.  
II. BETWEEN INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND DOMESTIC – THE TALLINN 
MANUAL AND THE U.S. LAW OF WAR MANUAL 
 The Interpretive Guidance represents the institutional view of the 
ICRC regarding the international humanitarian law applicable to the 
                                                          
72 Id. at 33. 
73 AP I, supra note 1, art. 51(3). 
74 INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 34. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 70. 
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notion of DPH. While it is an authoritative and compelling document, it 
does not represent binding international law. There are more concrete 
implementations of DPH in the intergovernmental context, such as The 
Tallinn Manual, and in the domestic context, the U.S. Law of War Manual. 
Thus, it is useful to analyze the Tallinn Manual and U.S. Law as they have 
slightly differing views on the notion of DPH as it applies to cyber-attacks.  
A. The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to 
Cyber Warfare 
 The Tallinn Manual is an initiative of the NATO Cooperative 
Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence, based in Tallinn, Estonia. The 
Tallinn Manual was published in 2012, and it is a non-binding set of rules, 
based on the rules pertaining to the use of force (in the UN Charter sense) 
and IHL. It was unanimously agreed upon by the group of experts assigned 
to draft the Tallinn Manual. The Tallinn Manual consists of black letter 
rules and a commentary for each rule presented. According to the Manual, 
the rules reflect lex lata (existing law) and not lex ferenda (the law that 
should be).77  
 Rule 35 of the Tallinn Manual, which is precisely the same as 
Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I and Article 13(3) of Additional 
Protocol II, reads “civilians enjoy protection against attack unless and for 
such time as they directly participate in hostilities.”78 The commentary that 
accompanies this rule sets forth some of the differences between the 
Interpretive Guidance and the Tallinn Manual.  
 With regard to the threshold of harm, while the Interpretive 
Guidance requires the materialization of harm or if harm did not 
materialize, the objective likelihood standard, the Tallinn Manual uses the 
term “intended or actual effect.”79 In other words, objective likelihood is 
not required for the threshold of harm requirement, but instead actual harm 
or individual intent to cause that harm is used. This is a lower standard 
than the one suggested by the Interpretive Guidance. Therefore, a civilian 
with intent to cause sufficient harm, who carries out a sloppy cyber-attack 
with no chance of affecting the targeted adversary, will still lose his 
protection from direct attack since the cyber-attack would still be seen as 
                                                          
77 See Ido Kilovaty, Cyber Warfare and the Jus ad Bellum Challenges: Evaluation 
in the Light of the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Warfare, 5 AM. U. NAT’L. SECURITY L. BRIEF, no. 1, 2014, at 91, 96.  
78 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 15, at 118 (rule 35). 
79 Id. at 119 (rule 35, cmt. 4) (emphasis added).  
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DPH under the Tallinn Manual approach.80 Such civilians who might not 
be the savviest hackers, might be more easily targeted due to the failure of 
their cyber operation.  
 The Tallinn Manual applies the intent standard to the second 
requirement of direct causation as well. It requires a “direct causal link 
between the act in question and the harm intended or inflicted.”81  
 The Tallinn Manual also describes the third requirement of 
belligerent nexus as “acts [that] must be directly related to the 
hostilities.”82 At first glance, it is a more expansive approach than the one 
suggested by the Interpretive Guidance. However, the footnote to that 
requirement is a reference to the Interpretive Guidance definition of “an 
act [that] must be specifically designed to directly cause the required 
threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment 
of another.”83 This suggests that the Tallinn Manual is actually in line with 
the Interpretive Guidance, and thus, this paper tends to disagree with the 
view that the Tallinn Manual’s perspective of belligerent nexus is more 
expansive than the one in the Interpretive Guidance.84 
B. U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual 
 The recent U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual 
represents, to some extent, a set of rules to govern the conduct of hostilities 
in armed conflicts. In a sense, it suggests desirable norms for cyber warfare 
as far as the U.S. is concerned.85 Although, naturally, the Law of War 
Manual binds the U.S. alone, its understanding of the DPH framework in 
cyberspace is analyzed in this section in an attempt to compare that 
understanding to the DPH norms advanced by the ICRC and NATO. 
 Rule 16.5.5 of the Law of War Manual entitled “Use of Civilian 
Personnel to Support Cyber Operations” provides that States are not 
prohibited under the law of war to employ civilian personnel to carry out 
cyber operations.86 This proposition, according to the Manual, is also true 
if the cyber operation amounts to DPH.87 Later in this Rule, the Manual 
                                                          
80 See Collin Allan, Note, Direct Participation in Hostilities from Cyberspace, 54 
VA. J. INT’L. L. 173, 182 (2013).  
81 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 15, at 119 (rule 35 cmt. 4).  
82 Id.  
83 Id. at 119–20 n.65.  
84 See Allan, supra note 75, at 189. 
85 See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17, at 1007. 
86 Id.  
87 Id. 
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provides that “Civilians who take a direct part in [cyber] hostilities forfeit 
protection from being made the object of attack.”88 However, the Manual 
does not give any guidance as to the notion of direct participation in cyber 
hostilities. Nonetheless, there is a separate chapter dealing with direct 
participation in non-cyber hostilities.89 
 Interestingly, the Manual clarifies that the United States did not 
adopt the definition of direct participation in hostilities as provided by 
Additional Protocol I90 or the ICRC Interpretive Guidance.91 Although 
this is the case, the Manual agrees that certain parts of the Interpretive 
Guidance are reflective of customary international law, while other parts 
are not.92 The general DPH framework, which the Manual suggests is a 
departure from the three-tiered structure, was adopted by both the 
Interpretive Guidance and the Tallinn Manual.93 
 First, the Manual focuses on the threshold requirement, by 
requiring either “proximate or “but for” cause of death, injury, or damage 
to persons or objects” or an adverse effect on military operations or 
capacity.94 Already in the description of the required harm, the Manual 
sets the standard of causation by demanding “proximate or “but for” 
cause.”95 The causation test provided by the Manual is somewhat looser 
than the one advanced by the Interpretive Guidance, since it could be 
satisfied with proximity and could apply to a broader set of cyber 
operations. 
 Second, the Manual sets forth the grounds for the belligerent 
nexus requirement, providing that hostile acts should be evaluated by the 
degree to which they are connected to military operations or by “the 
degree to which the act is temporally or geographically near the 
fighting.”96 The first condition is somewhat similar to the ICRC’s 
                                                          
88 Id. at 1008. 
89 See id. (describing rule 5.9). 
90 Id. at 222 
91 See Stephen Pomper, Toward a Limited Consensus on the Loss of Civilian 
Immunity in Non-International Armed Conflict: Making Progress Through 
Practice, 88 INT’L L. STUD. 181, 186 (2012) (“From the operational perspective, 
the feedback [on the ICRC’s INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE] was that the report was 
too rigid and complex, and did not give an accurate picture of State practice or (in 
some respects) of a practice to which States could realistically aspire.”).  
92 LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17, at 223. 
93 See id. at 226–27 (discussing the full structure of the LAW OF WAR MANUAL). 
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belligerent nexus interpretation. However, the broader term “military 
operations” is used in place of hostilities. Moreover, the condition of 
temporal and geographical proximity is again a departure from how 
belligerent nexus is generally understood, and in any case, represents a 
complication to cyber hostilities that might be temporally and 
geographically distant from the fighting.97 The following consideration 
put forth by the Manual is actually closer to the Interpretive Guidance 
understanding of the belligerent nexus requirement, although the state of 
mind required is slightly different. The Manual requires that the act be 
“intended to advance the war aims of one party to the conflict to the 
detriment of the opposing party.”98 However, the Interpretive Guidance 
requires an act that is “specifically designed to directly cause the required 
threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment 
of another.”99 Therefore, the Manual provides a standard that is lower and 
only requires intent, as opposed to the more objective standard of specific 
design. 
 Third, the Manual sets forth the military significance 
consideration, which focuses on the degree of contribution of the hostile 
act to the military action against the opposing party. It seeks to determine 
whether the value of contribution of the hostile act is comparable or greater 
than the more common DPH acts, or whether the hostile act poses 
significant risk to the targeted party.100 These considerations are not part 
of the Interpretive Guidance or Tallinn Manuals’ frameworks. However, 
it is reasonable to find them in a military manual, which provides a more 
specified set of considerations to support military operations. 
 Fourth, the Manual suggests evaluating whether the act is 
traditionally military, that is, whether the hostile act is performed 
traditionally by military forces (such as “combat, combat support, and 
combat service support functions”101) or whether there is a decision-
making process as to the use or application of combat power.102 However, 
it is unclear how this consideration could be applied to cyber-attacks, since 
cyber-attacks represent an emerging phenomenon that cannot at this point 
qualify as traditional, and there is insufficient data pertaining to the 
military application of cyberspace capabilities in times of armed conflict. 
 It is critical to understand that the aforementioned factors are 
considerations according to the Manual, and they provide some guidance 
                                                          
97 ROSCINI, supra note 8, at 207. 
98 LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17, at 226 (emphasis added). 
99 INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 58 (emphasis added). 
100 LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17. 
101 Id. at 227. 
102 Id. 
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for evaluation of whether a specific hostile act qualifies as DPH. However, 
the factors differ fundamentally from the views presented by the 
Interpretive Guidance and the Tallinn Manual, which have three basic 
requirements to be fulfilled in order for a civilian to qualify as a direct 
participant in hostilities.  
III. DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN ‘HACKTIVITIES’ – SHORTCOMINGS 
 Cyber-attacks in modern armed conflicts are only one factor that 
exacerbates the gaps and ambiguities within the DPH framework. As 
demonstrated in earlier sections, the DPH framework can be 
indeterminate, and there is a deep and fundamental disagreement as to the 
interpretation and application of critical points within the DPH analysis. 
These shortcomings will be discussed and analyzed in this section, with a 
focus on the difficulty regarding the characterization of a hostile cyber act 
as DPH and the temporal scope challenge. 
A. Boundaries of the Harm Threshold Cyber Activities 
 The DPH threshold requirements are particularly opaque and 
amorphous in the context of cyber operations. Nevertheless,  they contain 
at their core certain general notions that may be helpful in relation to 
certain cyber operations. Specific examples of such cyber operations exist, 
and they will be discussed in detail in the following sub-section. 
1. Passive v. Active Cyber Defenses 
 The DPH framework is inadequate when it comes to cyber 
operations intended to enhance the cyber defense of one party, while not 
directly targeting the opposing party to the armed conflict.103 Moreover, 
when a cyber operation only incidentally affects military operations of the 
opposing party, or when there is no direct causal link, the only possible 
conclusion is that such activity would not qualify as DPH. However, 
certain authors believe that the DPH framework applies to such acts.104  
 The Tallinn Manual explicitly addressed passive cyber defense by 
providing that “[s]ome members of the International Group of Experts 
took the position that acts that enhance one’s own military capacity are 
included, as they necessarily weaken an adversary’s relative position. An 
example is maintaining passive cyber defenses of military cyber 
assets.”105 However, before analyzing the position of the Tallinn Manual, 
it is essential to define active as opposed to passive cyber defenses, as 
often the two concepts are conflated. 
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105 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 15, at 119 (emphasis added). 
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 Jeffrey Carr, in his landmark book “Inside Cyber Warfare,” 
defined active cyber defenses as   
…electronic countermeasures designed to strike attacking computer 
systems and shut down cyber attacks midstream. Security 
professionals can set up active defenses to automatically respond to 
attacks against critical systems, or they can carry them out manually. 
For the most part, active defenses are classified, though programs that 
send destructive viruses back to the perpetrator’s machine or packet-
flood the intruder’s machine have entered the public domain.106 
 According to Carr’s definition, active cyber defenses can be 
manual, meaning that professionals carry them out as needed in response 
to actual or anticipated cyber-attacks, or automatic, meaning that the 
targeted computer system is set to respond using certain cyber measures if 
a cyber-attack occurs.107  
 Carr goes on to define passive defenses by limiting them to 
“traditional forms of computer security used to defend computer networks, 
such as system access controls, data access controls, security 
administration, and secure system design.”108 The focus in passive cyber 
defenses is that there is no hawkish response to cyber-attacks, but there are 
defensive layers resident in the computer systems that are meant to restrict 
or at least make it harder to access and manipulate the computer system.109  
 According to this analysis, it seems that if civilians are engaged in 
active cyber defense measures, such as actually countering cyber-attacks 
that reach the threshold of harm, they would be considered directly 
participating in hostilities. In contrast, if civilians are only involved in 
passive cyber defense measures, such as installing anti-virus software, 
encrypting critical data and securing the system, they would fulfill neither 
the direct causal link requirement nor the requisite threshold of harm.110 
                                                          
106 JEFFREY CARR, INSIDE CYBER WARFARE 46 (2nd ed. 2011). 
107 Id.  
108 Id. 
109 See Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to 
Cyberattacks: A Justification for the Use of Active Defense Against States Who 
Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2009); see also Oona 
Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CAL. L. REV. 817, 858 (2012) 
(discussing that “countermeasures might go beyond ‘passive defenses’ that aim 
to repel cyber-attacks (such as firewalls), and constitute ‘active defenses,’ which 
attempt to disable the source of an attack.”). 
110 See Emily Crawford, Virtual Battlegrounds: Direct Participation in Cyber 
Warfare, 9 J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 1, 15 (2012) (“[W]hile civilians 
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 The Law of War Manual recognizes that some civilians might be 
authorized to support cyber operations, and it provides that “[a]s with non-
cyber operations, the law of war does not prohibit States from using 
civilian personnel to support their cyber operations.”111 However, the Law 
of War Manual itself does not make the distinction between support that 
constitutes DPH and support that does not.112 
 The Tallinn Manual defines “passive cyber defense” as “a 
measure for detecting and mitigating cyber intrusions and the effects of 
cyber attacks that does not involve launching a preventive, pre-emptive or 
countering operation against the source. Examples of passive cyber 
defense measures are firewalls, patches, anti-virus software, and digital 
forensic tools.”113 Even given this definition, the Tallinn Manual 
concludes that such measures would qualify as DPH if carried out by 
civilians.114 This assertion, following the analysis provided in this section, 
is counterintuitive, and interestingly, Michael Schmitt himself (the 
General Editor of the Tallinn Manual) was less confident about that 
assertion. In a recent article, he asked, “Is passive cyber defense of enemy 
systems an act of direct participation such that contractors who perform 
the task lose their immunity from attack?”115 The fact that passive cyber 
defenses alone are becoming less efficient than active cyber defenses will 
increase the involvement of civilians in active defensive cyber operations 
and might expose them to the risk of being labeled as DPH.116 The 
                                                          
employed to generally maintain computer networks for an armed force (in the 
capacity of general IT services such as email, websites, etc.) would likely not be 
considered as taking direct part in hostilities, any employee or contractor who was 
specifically employed to conduct hostile CNA/CNE would, in theory, be 
considered as taking direct part in hostilities.”). 
111 LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17, at 1007. 
112 Id.  
113 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 15, at 261. 
114 Id. at 119.  
115 Michael N. Schmitt & Sean Wattset, The Decline of International 
Humanitarian Law Opinio Juris and the Law of Cyber Warfare, 50 TEX. INT’L. 
L.J. 189, 228 (2015).  
116 See Pascal Brangetto, Tomáš Minárik & Jan Stinissen, From Active Cyber 
Defence to Responsive Cyber Defence: A Way for State to Defend Themselves – 
Legal Implications, NATO LEGAL GAZETTE, Dec. 2014, at 16–17 (“The mere fact 
of labelling current defensive tools as passive is a call for a more empowering 
definition of cyber defence. The use of only passive measures is no longer 
sufficient to protect networks in the face of rising threat levels. As a way to 
overcome this, and to be able to hold the high ground, a concept was developed 
to enable the defending party to play an active part in its own cyber defence.”) 
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recommended approach is to distinguish between acts designed to enhance 
“general capacity to carry out unspecified hostile acts” and acts that are 
“aimed to carry out a specific hostile act.”117 
2. Data Destruction and Alternation 
 Cyber operations carried out by civilians that directly alter 
military data required for upcoming military operations will most likely 
qualify as adversely affecting military operations. According to some, 
such cyber operations would be equivalent to cyber operations that directly 
disrupt unmanned aerial vehicle systems, as well as radars and weapons 
that are operated by computer systems.118  
 While destruction of sensitive military data that directly and 
adversely affects military operations is a clear-cut case of direct 
participation in hostilities, there are far more difficult cases of data 
destruction such as destruction of medical data belonging to certain 
individuals.119 The immediate question then is whether such destruction 
would qualify as “destruction to objects” under the threshold of harm 
requirement.120 
 The Interpretive Guidance excludes “manipulation of computer 
networks” from the application of the DPH framework,121 while the 
                                                          
117 INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 66; see also Allan, supra note 80, 
at 191. 
118 See Nils Melzer, Cyberwarfare and International Law, UNITED NATIONS 
INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, 2011, at 28, http://www.unidir.org/ 
files/publications/pdfs/cyberwarfare-and-international-law-382.pdf  (“In line 
with this interpretation, cyber operations aiming to disrupt or incapacitate an 
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119 François Delerue, Civilian Direct Participation in Cyber Hostilities, Revista 
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php/idp/article/download/n19-delerue/n19-delerue-en. 
120 Compare INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 47 (discussing 
“destruction on . . .  objects protected against direct attack”) with AP I, supra note 
1, art. 52(1) (“Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. 
Civilian objects are all objects which are not military objectives.”). 
121 INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 50. 
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Tallinn Manual does not explicitly address destruction and alteration of 
data in the sense of DPH. By analogy to Tallinn Manual’s definition of 
“Cyber Attack”122 it can be inferred that the Tallinn Manual sees the 
destruction of data as a cyber-attack only if it results in physical effects, 
such as “injury or death of individuals or damage or destruction to physical 
objects.”123 Such an approach fails to acknowledge the importance of data 
in a modern, interconnected, and cyber-reliant society. An example 
demonstrating the inadequacy of this approach compares a cyber operation 
resulting in the complete deletion of data belonging to an entire State’s 
banking system with the physical destruction of a single data center. The 
data deletion is absent of injury, death or physical damage, would not 
qualify as a “cyber-attack,” and would unlikely be considered as DPH, 
whereas the destruction of a data center would fall under the “death, injury 
or destruction to objects” and would be considered as DPH.124 
 This paper’s key recommendation is to overcome the obsolete 
confines of physicality and to understand that in today’s world, data can 
be just as crucial to the overall wellbeing of a society as other physical 
objects. In discussing whether civilian data should be defined as an 
“object” under IHL, thereby prohibiting attacks on civilian data because 
such attack would be a violation of the prohibition on direct attacks against 
civilians and civilian objects,125 Michael Schmitt observed that while there 
is no definitive answer to the question, “data should not be characterized 
as an object in itself.”126 Even though not all targeted data would lead to 
severe consequences, some targeted data would nonetheless constitute a 
potential “civilian object” that enables the cyber operation to reach the 
threshold of harm because the operation would constitute an infliction of 
“destruction on . . . objects protected against direct attack.”127 As Schmitt 
suggested, there are two instances in which data should be considered an 
“object” under IHL. First, if the data is “directly transferable into tangible 
                                                          
122 Which, similarly to the threshold of harm requirement, the TALLINN MANUAL, 
at 107, defines as “cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is 
reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction 
to objects.”  
123 See Rain Liivoja & Tim McCormack, Law in Virtual Battlespace: The Tallinn 
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objects.”128 Banking data that represents data pertaining to actual physical 
objects (money), if deleted or altered, would therefore constitute 
destruction to physical objects. Second, data with intrinsic value, such as 
digital art, should also be considered an “object.”129  
 While protecting digital art is important, the focus should be on 
protecting data that is not necessarily directly transferable to physical 
objects, but nevertheless constitutes an integral part of societal structure 
and order. Examples include  police records, maps, and academic research, 
to name a few. These examples represent data that is not directly 
transferable to physical objects, but is nonetheless essential for every 
society in its day-to-day affairs. Moreover, it is immaterial whether data is 
digital or physical, since in both cases its destruction would cause harm, 
and claiming that only physical destruction counts for the purpose of DPH 
is counterintuitive and detrimental to the protection of the civil society.  
Although the DPH paradigm focuses on very physical aspects of 
destruction, when it comes to cyberspace, it is time to appreciate the 
importance and centrality of data and to protect it from exploitation. 
3. Critical Infrastructure Disruption & Civilian Nuisance and 
Inconvenience  
 Another problem arising from the threshold of harm requirement 
is the relationship to harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure. While it 
is clear that civilian harm (other than death, injury or destruction) 
accompanied by adverse military effect will reach the threshold, it is 
unclear whether harm to civilian life that results in major inconveniences, 
or even terrorization of civilians,130 could cross the threshold alone.131 
This question relates to “destruction” in the non-physical sense132 and 
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highlights one of the shortcomings of the DPH framework: it lacks 
adequate protections for civilians from hostilities carried out by other 
civilians. There is a double standard when it comes to non-physical 
destruction or harm. Such harm would reach the threshold if it adversely 
affects military operations. However, if it only adversely affects civilian 
wellbeing, the answer is unclear.  
 Two cyber-attacks illustrate this point. First, the cyber-attacks on 
Estonia133 in 2007 that caused the large-scale disruption of services in 
different areas, such as banking, administration, and media. Second, the 
cyber-attacks on Georgia134 in the wake of the 2008 Russian Georgian 
War that caused even less non-physical harm outside of the defacement of 
certain websites, such as the Georgian President’s website. Neither attack 
would reach the threshold of harm required by the DPH framework if it 
was established that they occurred in an armed conflict context, but carried 
out by civilians.135 
 Under this narrow interpretation, a cyber operation that targets a 
civilian power plant will only reach the threshold of harm if it adversely 
affects military operations or directly causes death, injury or (physical) 
destruction. However, under a broader interpretation even cyber 
operations that impose “mere harassment or inconvenience” to civilians 
would reach the threshold and qualify as hostilities.136 The Interpretive 
Guidance itself provides that “the interruption of electricity, water, or food 
supplies . . . . would not, in the absence of adverse military effects, cause 
the kind and degree of harm required to qualify as direct participation in 
hostilities.”137 However, while the Interpretive Guidance threshold of 
harm will not be crossed in instances of civilian harm, it is possible that 
the Tallinn Manual interpretation will be applicable. This is the case if the 
intent of the person carrying out the cyber operation was to cause death, 
injury or destruction, but the cyber operation ended up only causing non-
physical civilian harm. 
                                                          
133 For in-depth analysis of the Estonia cyber-attacks, see Stephen Herzog, 
Revisiting the Estonian Cyber Attacks: Digital Threats and Multinational 
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134 See David Hollis, Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008, SMALL WARS J., Jan. 
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 However, many scholars believe the threshold of harm is “under-
inclusive” when it comes to possible harms to civilians.138 The result is 
that “[c]yber warriors are free to engage in cyber operations that could 
exact a significant toll on the civilian population of the enemy State 
without risk of being targeted, a consequence seemingly at odds with the 
goal of protecting civilians from the consequences of armed conflict.”139 
Therefore, in order to meet the new threats posed by cyber operations, the 
DPH framework must recognize new potential harms, especially when it 
comes to civilians and civilian objects. 
4. Cyber Espionage on Military Intelligence Targets  
 Cyber operations that aim to gather data and military intelligence 
present another difficult issue under the DPH framework. Cyber espionage 
operations cannot generally be considered to reach the threshold of harm, 
as simply collecting intelligence does not directly cause physical damage, 
bodily harm, or death, and it is unlikely on its own to affect military 
operations or military capacity.  However, these operations could be 
considered as reaching the threshold of harm if they adversely affect the 
military operations or capacity of the targeted party. Such a scenario is not 
farfetched, as sensitive intelligence on upcoming military operations may 
well thwart and prevent a military operation, thus adversely affecting it.  
 The Interpretive Guidance adopts an approach that distinguishes 
two types of intelligence gathering. First, the Interpretive Guidance 
clarifies that “individuals whose function is limited to the purchasing, 
smuggling, manufacturing and maintaining of weapons and other 
equipment outside specific military operations or to the collection of 
intelligence other than of a tactical nature” would not be considered 
DPH.140 This is a rational approach as these activities contribute to the 
general war efforts, and the lack of operational-tactical value to the 
intelligence gathering activity would not adversely affect the military 
operations of the adversary. Second, even if the intelligence gathered is of 
a tactical nature, the Interpretive Guidance requires that it constitute an 
“integral part of a concrete and coordinated tactical operation that directly 
causes such [above the threshold] harm.”141  
                                                          
138 See Schmitt, supra note 33, at 719.  
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 Interestingly, the Tallinn Manual provides that “[c]yber espionage 
and other forms of information gathering directed at an adversary during 
an armed conflict do not violate the law of armed conflict.”142 However, 
the Manual later clarifies that in some instances, cyber espionage could 
constitute direct participation in hostilities, although no examples besides 
cyber espionage activities are given.143  
 Cyber espionage activities challenge both the threshold and 
temporal questions discussed infra. First, the impact of cyber operations 
that merely collect intelligence is not always visible or apparent, making 
it difficult to respond to with real-time targeting.144 Second, while cyber 
espionage activities might be detected while they are still ongoing, they 
can also be detected after intelligence collecting has ceased and the 
individual in question has stopped participating in the activity.145 To a 
lesser degree, similar challenges accompany cyber operations that actually 
produce physical effects that sometimes go undetected until well after the 
operations are completed. This was the case in Iran when Stuxnet infected 
its nuclear plants, causing massive damage to centrifuges.146 
 To overcome the challenges of cyber espionage carried out by 
civilians, contextual analysis is required. First, the focus needs to be on 
cyber operations collecting intelligence that is essential and integral to a 
military operation or the military capacity of an adversary. Second, the 
intelligence collected by the opposing party should be evaluated to 
determine whether it is objectively likely to reach the threshold of harm in 
a reasonable temporal proximity to the act of cyber espionage itself. Thus, 
not every intelligence collection operation would qualify as DPH, as it 
depends on whether such operation fulfills the threshold of harm 
requirement. 
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B. The Temporal Challenge 
 The temporal idea behind the DPH framework is that civilians are 
targetable “for such time as they take direct part in hostilities.”147 This 
means that if they cease to participate in hostilities, they are no longer 
targetable with lethal force.148 The Interpretive Guidance adds that the 
temporal scope includes “[m]easures preparatory to the execution of a 
specific act of direct participation in hostilities, as well as the deployment 
to and the return from the location of its execution. . . .”149 When it comes 
to cyber operations, the equivalent of “preparatory measures” and 
“deployment and return” is sometimes nonexistent, as cyber operations 
can be carried out instantaneously without any preparation or travel to and 
from the location of the attack. Consequently, there are two questions in 
regards to the temporal aspect. First, at what point in time do the activities 
undertaken by a civilian qualify as direct participation in hostilities? 
Second, at what point in time and under what conditions does a civilian 
cease being targetable under the DPH framework? The answer to both of 
these questions is far from obvious. 
 In a meeting on “Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law,” Nils Melzer, ICRC’s legal adviser, 
summarized the positions of current experts on the temporal scope issue: 
At one end of the spectrum were experts who preferred narrowly 
defining temporal scope and favoured strictly limiting loss of 
protection to the period where DPH is actually being carried out. At 
the other end were experts who said that, once a person had 
undertaken an act constituting DPH, that person must clearly express 
a will to definitively disengage and offer assurances that he or she 
will not resume hostilities in order to regain protection against direct 
attack. However, opinions varied greatly and could not easily be 
divided into two groups supporting distinct positions.150 
 In that meeting, opinions varied from a narrow scope of loss of 
immunity from an attack with the focus on the duration of the specific act 
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in question, to a broader scope that legitimizes targeting of civilians as 
long as the armed conflict takes place.151  
 The Interpretive Guidance adopted a somewhat more ambiguous 
and flexible scope by providing that “civilians lose protection against 
direct attack for the duration of each specific act amounting to direct 
participation in hostilities . . . .”152 
1. Beginning and Cessation of DPH Status 
 The Interpretive Guidance clarifies that “[m]easures preparatory 
to the execution of a specific act of direct participation in hostilities, as 
well as the deployment to and the return from the location of its execution, 
constitute an integral part of that act.”153 In addition, the Interpretive 
Guidance addresses cyber operations specifically, by providing that –  
Where the execution of a hostile act does not require geographic 
displacement, as may be the case with computer network attacks or 
remote-controlled weapons systems, the duration of direct 
participation in hostilities will be restricted to the immediate 
execution of the act and preparatory measures forming an integral 
part of that attack.154 
 The Tallinn Manual took a broader stance by including “actions 
immediately preceding or subsequent to the qualifying act. For instance, 
traveling to and from the location where a computer used to mount an 
operation is based…” in the temporal scope of the DPH framework.155 
 The Law of War, on the other hand, is not decisive on the temporal 
scope issue and focuses on the cessation rather than the beginning of the 
act as constituting DPH, by providing that: 
In the U.S. approach, civilians who have taken a direct part in 
hostilities must not be made the object of attack after they have 
permanently ceased their participation because there would be no 
military necessity for attacking them. Persons who take a direct part 
in hostilities, however, do not benefit from a “revolving door” of 
protection. There may be difficult cases not clearly falling into either 
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of these categories, and in such situations a case-by-case analysis of 
the specific facts would be needed.156 
 The temporal aspect is exacerbated in cyberspace due to the 
instantaneous nature of cyber operations through the initiation, effects 
materialization, and termination of the cyber operation.157 In addition to 
these difficulties, the effects of some cyber operations are only realized 
long after the perpetrator regained his or her civilian status.158 Some argue 
that the narrow opportunity to respond to cyber operations carried out by 
civilians in an armed conflict is too restrictive and would de facto 
eliminate the right to strike back.159 However, it is important to note that 
the DPH framework is intended to provide a tool to stop ongoing hostile 
acts, rather than punish the perpetrators ex post facto.160 The perpetrator 
may still face criminal prosecution as a consequence of his or her 
violations of international or domestic criminal law.161 The main 
difficultly remains with the prolonged effects of cyber operations, such as 
“logic bombs.”162 In this case, a major gap lies between civilians who 
cease carrying out cyber operations and the effects of these cyber 
operations still experienced by the victims. However, it is important to 
distinguish between two continued effects of cyber operations. First, there 
are cyber operations in which the attack code is actively running, causing 
continued effects.163 In this case, the individual carrying out the cyber 
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157 See Schmitt, supra note 121. 
158 Delerue, supra note 114, at 11. 
159 Schmitt, supra note 121, at 102 (“The restrictive interpretation of the for such 
time criterion would suggest that the direct participant can only be attacked while 
actually launching the operation. This is problematic in that many cyber 
operations last mere minutes, perhaps only seconds. Such a requirement would 
effectively extinguish the right to strike at direct participants.”). 
160 Delerue, supra note 114,  at 11. 
161 THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 41, at 
255–57. 
162 See Stephen Northcutt, Logic Bombs, Trojan Horses, and Trap Doors, SANS 
TECH. INST.: SECURITY LABORATORY: METHODS ATTACK SERIES (May 2, 2007), 
http://www.sans.edu/research/security-laboratory/article/log-bmb-trp-door 
(“Logic bombs are small programs or sections of a program triggered by some 
event such as a certain date or time, a certain percentage of disk space filled, the 
removal of a file, and so on. For example, a programmer could establish a logic 
bomb to delete critical sections of code if she is terminated from the company. 
Logic bombs are most commonly installed by insiders with access to the 
system.”). 
163 Dinniss, supra note 4, at 276. 
 
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 32 
operation is targetable during the time in which the code is running, as 
long as the DPH requirements are fulfilled.164 Second, there are cyber 
operations that cause continued effects. Those effects are not due to the 
ongoing cyber operation but instead to secondary and tertiary effects on 
the target’s computer systems and networks. In this situation, the 
individual would be targetable only during the duration of the cyber 
operation.165 
2. Concept of “Revolving Door” 
 While civilians who are members of non-state organized armed 
groups (OAGs) and assume a continuous combat function are targetable 
as long as they are members of that group,166 civilians who are not 
members of OAGs are generally targetable at the time their hostile act 
takes place. Civilians who directly participate in hostilities sometimes 
engage in repeated hostile acts on different occasions. Such action gave 
rise to the concept of a “revolving door,”167 referring to their statuses 
constantly changing between civilians and civilians who utilize DPH.168 
 While the Interpretive Guidance limits the application of the DPH 
framework to each hostile act,169 there was major disagreement among 
experts as the concept of “revolving door” in the Tallinn Manual.170 The 
Tallinn Manual posited that when an individual mounts repeated cyber 
operations, it is unclear (the experts were split) whether each act should be 
evaluated separately. Therefore, the duration of targetability is limited to 
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that act, or whether targetability “continues throughout the period of 
intermittent activity.”171 
 Conversely, the Law of War Manual is quite explicit on the issue, 
stating that “[t]he law of war, as applied by the United States, gives no 
‘revolving door’ protection; that is, the off-and-on protection in a case 
where a civilian repeatedly forfeits and regains his or her protection from 
being made the object of attack depending on whether or not the person is 
taking a direct part in hostilities at that exact time.”172 
 Realizing that most cyber-attacks today are carried out by 
organized groups is key to the assessment of the targetability of these 
individuals in an armed conflict context. For example, in April 2007, 
Estonia decided to relocate a memorial commemorating the Soviet 
liberation of Estonia from the Nazis from a central location in its capital 
to a less central area, which set off an intense period of riots and protests 
among the Estonian Russian-speaking community.173 In the aftermath, 
Estonia was attacked by a massive wave of cyber-attacks that targeted 
mostly its commercial banking and media websites.174 Although the 
cyber-attack did not occur in an armed conflict context, the cyber-attacks 
were led by an organized group called “Nashi” (Russian for “Ours”), 
which in the past conducted operations on Moscow’s behalf.175 This 
demonstrates that a massive cyber-attack, such as the Estonian attack, is 
often carried out by an organized group playing a repeat role in similar 
operations. These repeated acts should then be analyzed cohesively, 
transcending the evaluation of individual sporadic acts. 
(a) Characterization as Organized Armed Group? 
 The gap within IHL with regard to OAGs is apparent when applied 
to hacking groups. The broader question is whether a cyber operation is 
carried out by an individual civilian, whose DPH status will be evaluated 
individually, by civilians as part of a hacking group, who will be evaluated 
as members of organized armed groups, or by civilians with continuous 
combat function, who are targetable at all times due to their affiliation. 
More specifically, two issues arise from this concept. First, whether 
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“virtually” organized groups are “organized” and qualify as OAGs.176 
Second, whether hacking groups, who reach the threshold of harm, are 
“armed.”177 
 The Commentary to Additional Protocol I provides that “the term 
‘organized’ is obviously rather flexible, as there are a large number of 
degrees of organization.”178 It further provides that the fighting character 
of a group is “collective,” meaning that it is “conducted under proper 
control and according to rules,” rather than “individuals operating in 
isolation with no corresponding preparation or training.”179 In that sense, 
hacking groups can be acting under a direct command structure and 
carrying out their cyber operations collectively by sharing intelligence and 
hacking tools and by identifying exploitable vulnerabilities.180 Hacking 
groups that do not have a clear command structure but operate for a 
common cause are more difficult to analyze and should be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis. However, the assumption is that States will still deem 
them to be organized armed groups.181 
 The requirement of “armed” is closely related to a collective of 
individuals who can carry out “attacks” under IHL, meaning “acts of 
violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defense.”182  The 
Tallinn Manual defines cyber attacks as “cyber operation[s], whether 
offensive or defensive, that [are] reasonably expected to cause injury or 
death to persons or damage or destruction to objects.”183 The main issue 
with the notion of “armed” is that not all hacking groups are causing the 
required threshold of harm to be considered “armed” organized groups. 
However, there is a clear distinction between harm in the context of 
“armed,” which necessarily requires violent acts, and harm in the context 
of DPH, which is a more lenient standard that can be satisfied by adverse 
military effects, even in the absence of violent acts. Given that gap, 
individuals who are members of hacking groups might be considered 
DPH. However, these hacking groups will not be considered “organized 
armed groups” since the threshold for “armed” was not reached. That 
disparity challenges targeting decisions since each individual is evaluated 
in isolation from the whole group in question. In this regard, the DPH 
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framework is actually more permissive, and as the Israeli Supreme Court 
put it in the Targeted Killings case, “it is possible to take part in hostilities 
without using weapons at all.”184 
 Another major flaw in the context of OAGs is that the OAG is 
required to “belong to a party to the conflict.”185 This requirement might 
be fulfilled if the OAG is engaged in an armed conflict, whether 
international or non-international. One example is the Islamic State. It is 
engaged in an armed conflict against the United States while also carrying 
out concurrent cyber operations in relation to that armed conflict.186 
However, hacking groups that solely employ cyber operations are unlikely 
to trigger a separate armed conflict,187 as the threshold for such armed 
conflict would not be reached solely based on cyber operations.188 As the 
ICRC stated, “whether CNA [computer network attacks] alone will ever 
be seen as amounting to an armed conflict will probably be determined in 
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a definite manner only through future state practice.”189 In that regard, the 
Tallinn Manual clarifies that a non-international armed conflict using 
cyber terms “exists whenever there is protracted armed violence, which 
may include or be limited to cyber operations.”190 This introduces the 
possibility that cyber operations alone could qualify as non-international 
armed conflict if the operations reached “a minimum level of intensity” 
and a “minimum degree of organization.”191 This restatement represents a 
widely accepted definition, as stipulated by the International Criminal 
Tribunal in the Former Yugoslavia during the Tadic judgment.192 
The Interpretive Guidance provides that such groups, without 
belonging to a party to the armed conflict, “cannot be regarded as members 
of the armed forces of a party to the conflict” and are therefore considered 
civilians.193 But the Guidance further provides that such groups “could 
still be regarded as parties to a separate non-international armed conflict 
provided that [their] violence reach[ed] the required threshold.”194 
Consequently, unaffiliated hacking groups pose a great challenge to the 
notion of OAGs given that they might be acting on their own behalf, 
isolated from the armed conflict politics, and not reaching the threshold of 
armed conflict.195 However, as noted before, the DPH paradigm might still 
apply to these groups in relation to their cyber operation in an ongoing 
armed conflict, even if such groups are not parties to the conflict. This is 
because the DPH framework applies to civilians who directly participate 
in hostilities, rather than existing parties to armed conflict.196 
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 Overall, when a civilian engages in cyber operations sporadically 
and without a continuous pattern, he or she shall be protected after the 
cyber operation has ceased. However, evidence that points towards 
membership in hacking groups could cause a civilian to lose protection. In 
the rare cases where a hacking group is considered an OAG, members who 
carry out cyber operations on behalf of that OAG would not be protected 
after the cyber operation has ceased unless they permanently become 
unaffiliated with that OAG.  
CONCLUSION 
 The emergence of cyber operations as an integral part of modern 
armed conflicts introduces a myriad of challenges for legal experts and 
policymakers given the conspicuous absence of consistent state practices 
and the dearth of substantive norms needed to reform and ultimately 
govern cyberspace conduct. However, there are some key considerations 
that might assist in the norm formation process in relation to cyber 
operations in armed conflicts.  
 First, the threshold of harm needs to be refined to encompass new 
types of harms, which would trigger the forfeiture of civilian status. It must 
encompass effects that, although inconvenient, will not be considered 
direct participation in hostilities. For example, terrorizing civilians 
through cyber operations, alteration of critical civilian data, and 
incapacitating civilian services through cyber operations should be 
considered sufficient harm to trigger the DPH framework. However, 
effects and activities such as propaganda, commercial and non-tactical 
espionage, free expression relating to the armed conflict, and online 
advocacy, even if highly inconvenient, should not be considered DPH. The 
applicability of the DPH framework to a civilian does not necessarily mean 
that he will be targeted, but that the DPH framework will, in a way, assist 
in creating binding norms for behavior in cyberspace, particularly 
pertaining to civilians, in the context of an armed conflict.  
 Second, the temporal aspect of the DPH framework is another 
major issue. Cyber operations might be ongoing, in which case the 
perpetrators are targetable. However, operations are more commonly 
instantaneous and distant. The DPH framework was intended mainly to 
address “hot battlefield” issues, such as civilians physically participating 
in hostilities with geographical and temporal proximity to the battlefield. 
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We are witnessing the civilianization of the cyber-battlefield,197 that is, 
cyberspace is becoming a “civilian-occupied battlespace.”198 States, on the 
other hand, find it increasingly challenging to retain their monopoly over 
cyber-force, given the ease of use and accessibility of computer systems 
for civilians.199 Two phenomena accompany that assertion. First, civilians 
will become more involved in cyber operations during armed conflicts. 
Second, these civilians will be increasingly classified based on their status, 
either as civilians with continuous combat functions or contractors who 
participate in combat.200  
 At this point, only State practice, actual materialization of these 
predictions, and more serious and nuanced harms due to cyber operations 
can point towards the expected changes in the temporal concept as it 
relates to the DPH framework. The Interpretive Guidance, Tallinn Manual, 
and U.S. Law of War Manual’s uses of ambiguous and broad terms and 
concepts to address cyber warfare are inadequate, and reveal that even the 
most advanced instruments and organizations cannot solve these threats in 
one fell swoop. Thus, more thought and normative development, 
especially for international rules of conduct in cyberspace, are desperately 
needed. 
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